A renewal, or at least a revision, of moral theology is taking place. The reasons for this are many. Traditional Christian morality is breaking down in practice. The laity more and more do not accept the authority of the Church on matters of detail in private life. The discipline of moral theology has come out of its traditional isolation from Biblical studies, dogmatic theology and ascetical theology. It is seen to have more kin besides canon law in the family of theological studies. The appropriation of a pastoral, rather than a juridical, image of the function of the Church modified not only practice, but also theory. The more historical and dynamic notion of the people of God, in contrast with an ossified body of Christ, opens the way to taking historical change more seriously, and puts under question the high degree of immutability that has been assumed in morality as well as in theology. With the recovery of love and freedom as being close to the heart of the saving message of the gospel has come a rethinking of the place of law. Newer philosophical work has introduced conceptions of intersubjectivity and personhood, and the use of these concepts makes revision of the manualist moral theology necessary. The modern sciences of man have increased the awareness of the diversity and complexity of actual human life, and provided new data and new ways of understanding; these qualify the kinds of generalizations that traditionally have been made. The theology of grace provides a different background for the proper focus on the particular actions of men. No doubt many more factors are involved; many more reasons for renewal can be given.
Not all holding the situationist love ethic reply in the same way. But one widespread line of reply both narrows and deepens the question. Maintaining what would appear to be an unqualified pragmatism or consequentialism or utilitarianism, the reply identifies the good with "whatever works," i.e. with helpful consequences. 6 The question is thus moved a step further and becomes: What does it mean "to work" or~" . Ramsey attacks by name the consequentialism of Joseph Fletcher; one of his principal criticisms is that Fletcher fails to answer clearly and coherently the question of the present article. It would be rash to step between these two combatants in an attempt to settle the matter. One can note, however, that Fletcher's fusion of a love ethic with consequentialism (or utilitarianism) does not per se explain how one evaluates consequences. "We need not try to assert some supposed mutual exclusion between agape and the 'happiness' that utilitarians want. All depends on what we find our happiness in: all ethics are happiness ethics. With hedonists it is one's own pleasure (physical or mental); with neo-Aristotelians it is self-realization; with naturalists, it is adjustment, gratification and survival. Happiness is the pragmatista satisfaction. It is 'how you get your kicks.' The Christian situationist's happiness is in doing God's will as it is expressed in Jesus' Summary. And his utility method sets him to seeking his happiness (pleasure, too, and self-realization!) by seeking his neighbors' good on the widest possible scale" (Situation Ethics, p. 96). Which leaves untouched the question how one evaluates in the concrete, foreseeable consequences of given decisions what is good or better or less evil. The question is all the more difficult to answer in the framework of Fletcher's theological positivism: that love is the highest good is simply a matter of faith (ibid., pp. 46-50).
love and therefore has a definition which relates it immediately to the love of man and woman-with all the demands of this love. Furthermore, I am suggesting that we can come to know this meaning even if the scientific empiricism of our time has not proved it and cannot prove it. 8 McCormick's questions and objections are not those of debate, seeking to refute, but of dialogue, seeking greater clarity and thus possibly agreement. His comments certainly underline the question that has to be answered by the kind of empirical consequentialism or pragmatism we have been discussing. It cannot appeal ultimately to principles in order to evaluate the experienced consequences; for in this approach principles have only relative normative weight and they are determined by the experience of the consequences, not vice versa.
Other ethicists, such as Eugene Borowitz, are urging the same question when they fault sexual researchers for implicitly drawing ethical inferences 8 from their empirical data without introducing an appropriate methodology to justify the inferences.
[The researchers] do not always carefully observe the strictures they themselves lay down between science and ethics. Ira Reiss, regarded as one of the leaders in this field, whose careful statement on science and ethics was noted above, is a case in point. Reiss does not hesitate to call the collection of articles he edited "The Sexual Renaissance in America," and he uses that term several times in his own contributions. It is doubtfiil whether there are objective sociological criteria for a "renaissance," and no effort is made to show how the term is scientifically derived from the material assembled. Further, he seems only to see possibilities of more permissive sex practices and never the possibility of reaction. Thus Reiss is often less a scientist than a missionary. In the same volume Lester Kirkendall, in the article "Interpersonal Relationships-Crux of the Sexual Renaissance" (pp. 45 ff.), seems only to be reporting on a shift of sexual values, but it is difficult to avoid the impression that here, as in his book, he is urging us to accept a personalist ethical standard. I find this standard appealing but do not see how surveys on sex behavior can establish that any criterion should be accepted as the basis of our judgment of the lightness of sex acts.
9
James Gustafeon, I believe, is raising the same question when he speaks of my "seeming affirmation... of an uncritical utilitarianism," and goes on to comment on two statements of mine.
"Then do something that helps!" "Good medicine [is] good morality and vice versa " These statements cry out for careful analysis, as Milhaven certainly knows. What is it that helps? What medicine is "good"? Helps whom? Whose good? A question as old as Plato will have to be reckoned with, namely, what is the good? I think it will be necessary to discard the use of such general notions, and to designate more precisely the varying elements embodied in human wellbeing. Physicians, psychiatrists, and social scientists will, I agree, make increasing contributions to our understanding both of the ends of action, and of the effective means. But whether moral discourse can be reduced to medical, psychiatric or social scientific discourse is by no means clear. 
11
In the present article, however, the question of moral absolutes will not be taken up, since it has been discussed to satiety in recent years and it It is a sort of 'we believe in deed not creed' mentality. The fallacy of this approach is that it is impossible. There is no such thing as technique or deed without value judgment; there are no value judgments without some sort of general philosophy. The 'myth of objective con sciousness' or Value-free' technique is fallacious because it is impossible. You cannot act without intention, and intention means meaning." In my statement "good medicine is good ethics" he finds implied a "wholesale lunge from natural law ethics to U.S. technologism" ("Culture and Counterculture in U.S. Politics," America, Nov. 14, 1970, pp. 397-98).
11 Charles Curran defines well this type of absolute as "the absolute moral prohibition of certain actions which are defined primarily in terms of the physical structure of the act" is admitted that the absolutes can affect only a tiny fraction of moral decisions and therefore the essential thrust of consequentialism does not concern them.
12
It is worth noting, however, that a large number of moral decisions are made on the basis of general principles that the moral agent does not hold as absolute, but which he usually applies as if they were. If the moral agent sees that one consequence of his decision would be to contribute to illegal violence or (given a different set of principles) to contribute to the carrying out of war, he examines the consequences no further. The decision would be morally evil no matter what the consequences. He admits in principle that illegal violence or war can in exceptional cases be justified. But he never inquires seriously in any situation whether the exception is here verified.
Our consequential does not contest that this uncritical use of principles as absolutes is necessary most of the time in making day-by-day concrete decisions. One does not often have time to probe the likely consequences in a given situation and so one has to decide on the basis of principles already formed. The fact that my decision would involve running over a pedestrian or causing deep pain to my wife or ruining a man's good name can usually settle the moral question for me. I can presume that the decision would be morally evil, and I need examine the consequences no further.
The consequentialism that I am presenting is, therefore, not a complete rejection of the uncritical use of principles as absolutes, but is an attempt to provide a critique of them, a higher court of appeal, when the occasion warrants. When there is reason to ask whether the principle is false or should be modified or at least does not apply here, a consequentialist methodology is offered as the only way of answering. But rather than analyze the consequentialist critique of this genre of principle, it may be more illuminating to turn to a more basic type of principle, which in point of fact usually lies behind and determines those of the above-mentioned genre. This more basic principle is the proportionate assessment an individual has of values and disvalues. The principle is often seen to operate, for example, when the individual has to choose between two consequences. 13 Obedience to the Church is more important than personal 12 "The problem of norms, then, seems to be the problem of the significance of concrete pieces of human conduct. If the problem is seen as one oí absolute norms (particularly absolute prohibitions), it must be candidly admitted that it is not much of a problem; for even traditional theological categories-when properly understood-admitted very few absolute prohibitions'' (McCormick, op. cit., p. 260).
18 Let it be said once here for the rest of the article that in moral questions arising in concrete human life this type of principle must be applied to a more complex situation: there are usually more than two consequences and two values at stake. But even in the more nor-fulfilment (or vice versa). Black power is more important than the races living peaceably together (or vice versa). The experience of a "trip" is worth the possible harm to health (or is not). Here, too, the consequentialist does not contest that the uncritical use of such principles is necessary in day-by-day decision-making. One could give numerous examples in noncontroversial areas (unlike the three listed above) where no critique would be called for. The ability of my philosophy students to think for themselves cogently and with insight is more important than their memory of names and dates. I need not bother, most of the time, raising the question whether this principle may fail to apply to my class today. Similarly, I rarely need to examine critically my application of the principle that personal courtesy is more important than personal convenience.
The word "principle" is perhaps not a happy term for the determinant of moral judgment that has just been described. Nor does the formula "more important than" express with complete accuracy what it is that determines the judgment of the moral agent. True, how much he values personal fulfilment and how much he values obedience to the Church are really what determine his judgment. But this quantitative way of expressing the process does not communicate the fact that this kind of principle does not function like a law or rule or mathematical principle. The degree to which I value personal fulfilment and obedience to the Church may make me, in conflict cases between the two values, choose the latter most of the time, but the former fairly often. This is because, with this kind of principle, the "more important" can in given situations become concretely the "less important," e.g., when the law to be obeyed is of minor significance and the frustration of personal fulfilment would be of a severely damaging kind. No matter how highly I value the encouragement of independent thought in my students, I will at times see that it is better to teach some names and dates. Hardly any man who holds that saving a nation from Communism is more important than sparing lives that would be lost in war would deny that there is a cutoff point. Without changing his basic proportionate assessment of the two values, the balance can, in a concrete situation, dip to the other side. Not every Communist nation should be immediately liberated at whatever cost to life.
One uses the term "hierarchy of values" to designate this generalized, proportionate assessment of given values that determines many, perhaps most, of a man's moral judgments. "Hierarchy" is perhaps as appropriate a metaphor as any, but can be misleading, precisely because, as the examples above illustrate, the priority or proportion between given values is not a fixed one when applied to concrete situations. In using principles of this mal and complex problematic, it is essentially the same type of principle as is illustrated in the choice between two consequences each embodying a value. Human values are many, and many things which men value can be ethically and theologically justified. They do not fall into a neat pattern of priorities which smooths the abrasiveness of particular situations. " Not only is an individual's proportionate assessment of values fluid in application and consequently often difficult to apply, but it is even more difficult to communicate it to another individual. Language analogous to science or law, or any brief, direct verbal expression, is a particularly ineffective means of communicating it. Two persons can agree verbally on a given proportionate assessment, e.g., that courtesy and hospitality are more important than personal convenience, just as they agree that there are exceptional situations where the reverse is true. Yet such a husband and wife, on a given evening, can disagree sharply on the lengths to which they should go to make a visiting couple feel at home. Of course, the real cause of the disagreement may not be the principle they are applying. The husband may have a fear of offending the guests for reasons connected with his professional career. The wife may harbor a personal resentment against one of them. But the cause could also be that behind the verbal agreement the husband and wife hold two different principles. One of them may have a greater appreciation of the value of courtesy and consequently a different proportionate assessment of the two values at stake. Similarly, two friends might agree verbally that saving a nation from Communism should in general be preferred to sparing human life and yet really mean two different things and consequently disagree on the Viet Nam war. Nor can the two men, or the husband and wife, easily uncover and identify the difference in proportionate assessment of values.
It was not at all unknown to moralists of the tradition that a great number of the decisions a man has to make day by day are determined, not by principles that can be immutably and easily applied and readily communicated in words, but by principles that are proportionate assessments of values, are applicable only fluidly and often with difficulty, and resist verbal communication. The principle of the comparative value of obedience to law and personal fulfilment is a conspicuous example in the tradition. It is simply that certain contemporary trends have a much greater concern with this kind of principle and with providing a critique for its use; for this kind of principle is the decisive factor in the making of the kind of moral judgments with which these trends are most concerned, i.e., judgments of one's responsibility to act positively and helpfully in a given situation. Experience is the best teacher because, in the last analysis, it is the only teacher. Only in experience do we actually engage the real; only in experience is reality itself disclosed to us. Our ideas and our theories are not the real itself, in person, as it were; they are at best the real as thought about. They result from our effort to formulate the natures and connections revealed in action
In short, we think in order to act better. But we shall act better only if the map is accurate. The validity of our theories rests on their conformity to what is disclosed. If, unexpectedly, they lead us into a swamp, the map should be revised. Vernon Bourke comments on the only three approaches he sees as representing "the spirit of strictly contemporary ethics," i.e., naturalism, linguistic analysis, and existentialism. "Of these three, existentialism really rejects theoretical ethics, and language analysis offers no ethical content other than the moral attitudes of the British gentleman who still remembers the period of Queen Victoria. Neither a distinctive new method nor a new set of ethical judgments is forthcoming from these two schools. This leaves us with naturalism as a possible base for an ethics of the future. I do not mean that extreme position which entirely rejects the supernatural and relies on hard science only. There would seem to be some latent possibilities in a broad theory that ethical judgments might find their justification in the experienced facts of human life.
"What is needed now is some spark of genius to provide a revised method of making such a reflective justification, perhaps not an entirely new method, but one that will keep us open to empirical data and the dimensions of human personality, without shutting us off from the exercise of reason and the light of intuitive understanding." If the reflective justification, exercise of reason, and intuitive understanding are understood as either taking place in experience or merely explicitating and correlating what takes place in experience, then Bourke is recommending the epistemology presented by the present article. The perception and the interpretation of the moralist is not a simple matter to discuss. It would be simpler if the author could reduce his perspective to: (a) theological and philosophical principles; (b) moral inferences drawn from these; and (c) rational application of these principles to a narrowly defined case. But more than belief, principles and logic are involved in the moral decision. A basic perspective towards life accents certain values and shadows other. Attitudes, af fections and feelings of indignation against evil, compassion for suffering, and de sire for restoration of wholeness colour one's interpretation and judgment. Imag ination, sensitivity and empathy are all involved. For Christians, and many others presumably, love is at work, not merely as a word to be defined, and as a subject of propositions so that inferences can be drawn from it, but love as a human re lationship, which can both move and inform the other virtues, including prudence and equity (to make a reference to St. Thomas). All of this does not mean that a moral judgment is a total mystery, it does not mean that it is without objec tivity. It does, however, indicate that it is more complex than traditional Catholic manuals would make it. 21 urges that "the need is for a rationality that can transcend itself through imagination" (art. cit., p. 398). Fletcher, too, draws the analogy between art values and moral values, but the point of comparison is that the affirmation of both must be an act of free and blind faith. "Aesthetic and ethical propositions are like faith propositions, they are based upon choice and decision." "Value choices are made and normative standards embraced in a fashion every bit as arbitrary and absurd as the leap of faith" (Situations Ethics, p. 48).
19 Vernon Bourke finds "noteworthy" "the growing number of sympathetic studies of Dewey's ethics written by American Catholic philosophers in the past two decades" (History of Ethics, p. 269). Two evident examples are Robert J. Roth, S.J., "A Naturalist Theory of Ethics," Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association (1966) pp. 63-86, and Robert O. Johann, Building the Human (New York, 1968). Roth is recapitulating and developing earlier writings of his, e.g., John Dewey and Self-Realization (Englewood Cliffs, 1963). Johann's book sets out his own personal synthe sis, but his recognized debt to Dewey is great; cf. "Reflective Pragmatism," pp. 20-23. Edward Stevens, S.J., Making Moral Decisions (New York, 1969), "tends to favor the pragmatic view of society" (p. 26). Stevens contends that the intelligence of the pragmatist is a necessary complement to the vagueness of the contemporary love ethic (pp. 23-26). Bourke, in raising hope for a future development of naturalism in ethics (cf. η. 17 above), is evidently referring to the naturalism he presents earlier in his history, and in particular to the pragmatism of John Dewey, which he describes under that heading (pp. 267-69). 20 Cf., for example, Sum. theol. 1, q. 79, a. 12, c; 1-2, q. 62, a. 3, c; 1-2, q. 100, a. 1, c; 2-2, q. 47, a. 6, ad 3; In 6 Eth. Not only does the affective stance of an individual inescapably affect his moral judgment, but (as, I believe, Gustafson implies) it can be responsible for some of the objective insight the individual has into value. Far from being blind, love can enable a man to see more value than he would otherwise have seen. Or, as the fox told the little prince, "it is only with the heart that one can see rightly."
In the rest of this article I am concerned to explicate this epistemology-and suggest several ways in which it contributes to a critique, negative and positive, of the individual's proportionate assessment of values. The article, therefore, purports to elaborate only a partial answer to the epistemological question under discussion. It presupposes that a critical methodology for assessing values is more extensive and complex than the epistemology of love represents. 22 But it presupposes also that current ethical discussion and debate have not drawn out all the useful implications of this one element of the total methodology, namely, the love epistemology. The article is not a rebuttal or criticism of any position, but an attempt to indicate a step or two that contemporary ethicists might take together, beyond debate, into further, enlightening discussion.
The love epistemology is a truism of the tradition. One expression of it, evident to ordinary human experience as well as to Western philosophy, is the truth Christian moralists derived from Aristotle: a man cannot have moral wisdom unless he possesses also the moral virtues. 23 That is, his judgment is valid in the case of abortion which Gustafson is considering, can still admit that other moral judgments can be validly grounded this way. McCormick, too, underscores the "subjective aspects of the perception of significance." "It has been accepted for centuries that the basic process of moral knowing (which reflective ethics must presume and upon which it builds) is not simply a matter of cerebralization. Contrarily, it is colored, qualified, conditioned by a host of personal factors" ("Human Significance and Christian Significance," in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, p. 254). 22 Gustafson does more justice to the extension and complexity in "Moral Discernment in the Christian Life," in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, pp. 17-36.
23 E.g., "It is clear, then,... that it is not possible to be wise in practical matters without moral virtue" (Nie. Eth. 6, 1144 b 30). Aristotle's love epistemology is radical: although moral virtue is not of the rational part of the soul but of the appetitive, nevertheless it alone can determine the end to be chosen. The function of practical wisdom (phronêsis) is merely to make us take the means that lead to the end. Without moral virtue, practical wisdom would not know the right ends at all (Nie. Eth. 6, 1144 a 6-1145 a 6; 1138 b 13-1139 a 2; cf. H. H. Joachim's commentary, The Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 217-18, 163-64). For the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, cf. also Th. Deman, O.P., "Appendice Π: Renseignements techniques," in La prudence: Traduction française de la Somme thé-ologique de saint Thomas aVAquin (Paris, 1949) pp. 413-14; for the respective functions of moral virtue and practical wisdom, cf. also pp. 417-18, 423. Unless there is an inclination towards the end, i.e., unless there is moral virtue, practical wisdom has no starting point from which to make its conclusions, i.e., concerning that which leads to the end. Cf. André intellect cannot acquire the stable disposition enabling it regularly in the concrete situations to know what he ought to do, unless his appetites acquire the stable dispositions enabling them regularly to tend towards the right values.
Similarly, the strength or weakness, presence or absence, of a particular virtue will affect moral judgment. For it is virtue that orders the appetite and it is the well-ordered appetite which orders the person to objective goals. And finally it is such an ordering of the person which helps guarantee truth in his prudential or value judgments in the concrete. We are familiar with the everyday wisdom that only the truly chaste man can make genuinely secure judgments about the morality of individual acts in the area of sexual expression. Only the charitable man possesses the security that his fraternal correction is an act of charity. Contrarily, it is often the alcoholic who is convinced that only one drink "just this once" is possible. The difference between antecedent and consequent conscience judgments measures the extent to which appetite can control judgment. A sinful habit not only makes virtuous conduct more difficult; it makes it more difficult to recognize. mother and a nervous child, a teacher and a remiss student, a religious superior and a rebellious subject. In the abstract, the values at One thrust of consequentialism, I have maintained, is to subject basic value assessments to a critique, i.e., to expose the subjective ones and move to forming more objective ones. But consequentialism seems to end up merely telling one to love more and experience more in the hope of obtaining the pertinent, inexpressible insight. Which may be epistemologically justifiable, but hardly appears to constitute a critique of any manageable, useful kind. If, for example, an individual or members of a group want to face the question honestly whether their appraisals of certain values at stake in a situation are fully objective, to tell them to go out and love and experience more is not to suggest a promising methodology.
In an attempt to meet this objection, let it be prenoted that a critique of a legal or scientific model has already been excluded by the nature of the insight and its affective origin. Those who accept an ethical critique only of such models can spare themselves pain by reading no further. But there is, first of all, a certain extrinsic critique fostered by a more reflexive awareness of the love epistemology itself. Doctors in a given hospital may face the question whether they are giving enough labor, time, and financial sacrifice to serve the poor of the neighborhood. A love epistemology tells them that they are not likely to have had good reasons for their present policy, if they have not personally had love, i.e., serious concern for the poor. True, "serious concern" cannot be tested by conceptual analysis or logic or any form of intellectual debate or argument. But it can be tested by action. If the whole life of a given doctor contains little service, direct or indirect, of the poor, then it is unlikely that he has the pertinent affective orientation or the consequent objective insight into the disvalue of poverty. On the other hand, there is some ground for hoping that one who consistently serves the poor at personal sacrifice has objective appreciation of the evil.
The above type of critique is indirect and rarely decisive. Is there any way the individual can directly move, or be moved, to more objective appreciation of values? In the real world the answer often is: he cannot. Such an answer points to another context for the concern of contemporary moral theology (as it was for traditional moral theology), namely, moral education. In this context at least, there appears to be place for a consequentialist critique. In fact, the men competent in catechetics and religious education seem to be leading the way for the professional moralists. They make experience and active involvement central to moral education. The student encouraged to be of assistance to the sick poor begins to learn how bad a thing helplessness and loneliness can be. His youthful idealism, becoming more and more involved with the sick poor, opens his eyes to disvalues he had not dreamt of. There is a spiraling dialectic between moral commitment and moral knowledge. Lived love makes possible objective understanding of more of the value or disvalue, but the understanding in turn tends to increase the love, and so on.
The same kind of educative spiral of affective involvement and understanding of value emerges in less practically active forms of sharing experiences and/or group dynamics, e.g., in seeing films, in visiting and talking with persons involved in various situations, and the sharing of feelings and personal convictions of teachers and students on a given moral question, followed by reactions back and forth. 29 A seminary professor, for example, who would object that this last procedure provides a far more limited communication of truth and far less objective critique of the student's learning than lecture, exams, term paper, etc., has never taken active part in such a session. At least when the majority of the members are honestly interacting with feelings and personal experiences as well as critical reflection, one's convictions are challenged and one is moved to insight more powerfully (and painfully) than by almost any other educational procedure.
It is in an analogous way of sharing experiences that a man whose days of formal education are past may still be capable of criticizing his basic moral stances and moving to a more objective appreciation of values. He may, for example, have a genuine compassion for sufferers, even though other feelings keep it from coming to bear on people on the welfare rolls. Certain experiences, perhaps weekends visiting and talking with families on welfare, might break through his social prejudices, awake his compassion, tum it to these people, and eventually make more objective his appreciation of the evil of their condition.
A good example of essaying this genre of sharing experience in order to gain moral understanding was the 1970 meeting of the American Society of Christian Ethics. The members did not merely spend three days discussing various moral questions concerning American blacks; they spent the days totally immersed in a black community (the hosts and their educational facilities, neighborhood, motel, etc.) and in good part listening to and interacting with black theologians. The interaction was often emotional and personal. Many, perhaps all, of the white ethicists 29 To view certain films used in moral education today (e.g., "To Be a Man," "To Be a Woman,'* and "To Be In Love" of Billy Budd Films) and to watch the progressive reaction of the students is to recognize that it is not simply question of a new pedagogical technique, but that the moral knowledge communicated and the epistemology involved are essentially different from the knowledge and epistemology of the exposition of encyclicals and naturallaw principles of a decade ago. The contention of certain contemporary trends is that on the most sophisticated level of the science of ethics it is the same new kind of knowledge that is at stake and the same new epistemology that must be recognized as operative. 
